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Abstract
We consider the problem of increasing the threshold parameter of a secret-sharing scheme
after the setup (share distribution) phase, without further communication between the dealer
and the shareholders. Previous solutions to this problem require one to start off with a non-
standard scheme designed speciﬁcally for this purpose, or to have secure channels between
shareholders. In contrast, we show how to increase the threshold parameter of the standard
CRT secret-sharing scheme without secure channels between the shareholders. Our method can
thus be applied to existing CRT schemes even if they were set up without consideration to
future threshold increases.
Our method is a positive cryptographic application for lattice reduction algorithms, and we
also use techniques from lattice theory (geometry of numbers) to prove statements about the
correctness and information-theoretic security of our constructions.
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1. Introduction
Background: A (t, n)-threshold secret-sharing scheme is a fundamental cryptographic
primitive, which allows a dealer owning a secret to distribute this secret among a
group of n shareholders in such a way that any t shareholders can reconstruct the
secret, but no subset of less than t shareholders can gain information on the se-
cret. Two classical constructions for (t, n) secret-sharing schemes are the integer-based
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) scheme [18,1] and the Shamir polynomial-based
scheme [21].
A common application for (t, n) secret-sharing schemes is for achieving robustness
of distributed security systems. A distributed system is called robust if system security
is maintained even against an attacker who manages to break into/eavesdrop up to a
certain number of components of the distributed system. For example, access control to
a system can be enforced using a secret shared among n system servers using a (t, n)-
threshold secret-sharing scheme, while maintaining security if less than t servers are
compromised. In such applications, the threshold parameter t must be determined by a
security policy, based on an assessment which is a compromise between the value of the
protected system and attacker resources and capabilities on the one hand (which require
as high a threshold as possible) and user convenience and cost on the other hand (which
require as low a threshold as possible). In many settings, the system value and attacker
capabilities are likely to change over time, thus requiring the security policy and hence
threshold parameter t to vary over time. In particular, an increase in system value or
attacker capabilities after the initial setup with a relatively low threshold parameter t,
will require an increase in the threshold parameter to a higher value t ′ > t . The longer
the lifetime of the system, the more likely that such a change will be needed. Note
that we assume that shareholders will cooperate honestly in making the transition to
the larger threshold t ′ > t . Indeed, the attacker in our setting is assumed to be an
outsider.
Previous solutions: A trivial solution to the problem of increasing the threshold
parameter of a (t, n)-threshold secret-sharing scheme to t ′ > t is for the shareholders
to discard their old shares and for the dealer to distribute new shares of a (t ′, n)
secret-sharing scheme to all shareholders. However, this solution is not very attractive,
since it requires the dealer to be involved after the setup stage and moreover requires a
secure channel between the dealer and each shareholder. Such channels may not exist
or may be difﬁcult to establish after the initial setup stage. A much better solution
would allow the threshold to be changed at any time without any communication
between the dealer and shareholders after the setup stage. Such ‘dealer-free’ solutions
to the threshold increase problem have been proposed in the literature (see related work
below), but they all suffer from other disadvantages: either secure channels between
the shareholders are required, or they require one to start off with a non-standard
(t, n)-threshold scheme designed speciﬁcally for threshold changeability.
Our contributions: In this paper, we present a new method for increasing the thresh-
old of the standard CRT (t, n)-threshold secret-sharing scheme [18,1]. In contrast to
previous solutions, our method does not require communication between the dealer
and shareholders after the initial setup stage nor between shareholders, and can be
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applied to existing CRT schemes even if they were set up without consideration to
future threshold increase. The basic idea of our method is the following: to increase
the threshold from t to t ′ > t , the shareholders add an appropriate amount of random
noise to their shares (or delete a certain fraction of the bits of their share) to compute
subshares which contain partial information about (e.g. half the bits of) the original
shares. Since the subshares contain only partial information about the original shares,
a set of t subshares is no longer sufﬁcient to reconstruct the secret uniquely, but if one
observes a sufﬁciently larger number t ′ > t of subshares then one can expect the secret
to be uniquely determined by these t ′ subshares (e.g. if the subshares contain only
half the information in the original shares then one can expect that t ′ = 2t subshares
will uniquely determine the secret). By replacing the share combiner algorithm of the
original (t, n)-threshold secret-sharing with an appropriate ‘error-correction’ algorithm
which can uniquely recover the secret from any t ′ subshares, we obtain the desired
threshold increase from t to t ′, leaving the secret unchanged, and without any secure
channels.
Our efﬁcient ‘error-correction’ combiner algorithm for the CRT secret-sharing scheme
is constructed using lattice basis reduction techniques. Thus, our method is a new
positive cryptographic application for lattice reduction algorithms. Furthermore, we also
use techniques from lattice theory (geometry of numbers) to prove concrete statements
about the correctness and security of our construction. Although our threshold-increase
method does not yield a perfect (t ′, n) secret-sharing scheme, we prove useful results
about the information-theoretic security of our method. Roughly speaking, we prove
that for any desired  > 0, our method can be used to change the threshold to t ′ > t
(meaning that any t ′ subshares can be used to recover the secret) such that any ts <
t ′ − (t ′/t) observed subshares leak to the attacker at most a fraction  of the entropy
of the secret, where  can be made as small as we wish by an appropriate choice of
security parameter.
Related work: Several approaches to changing the parameters of a threshold scheme
in the absence of the dealer have been proposed in the literature. The technique of secret
redistribution [6,16] involves communication among the shareholders to ‘redistribute’
the secret using the new threshold parameter. Although this technique can be applied
to standard secret-sharing schemes, its disadvantage is the need for secure channels
for communication between shareholders. Methods for changing threshold which do
not require secure channels have been studied in [4,14,15,13], but they all require the
initial secret-sharing scheme to be a non-standard one, specially designed for threshold
increase (as a simple example of such a non-standard scheme, the dealer could provide
each shareholder with two shares of the secret: one share for a (t, n) scheme and one
share for a (t ′, n) scheme).
Our scheme uses a lattice-based ‘error-correction’ algorithm which is a slight variant
of an algorithm for ‘Noisy Chinese Remaindering in the Lee Norm’ due to Shpar-
linski and Steinfeld [22]. The authors of [22] left it as an open problem to ﬁnd a
cryptographic application of their algorithm. Our work shows one such application. We
remark also that although the correctness proof of our scheme is based on the work
of [22], our security proof is new and the lattice-based techniques used may be of
independent interest. Indeed, our results provide a (probabilistic) lower bound on the
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number of solutions to the noisy Chinese remaindering problem when the solution is
not unique, whereas [22] only analyze the case when the solution is unique (up to an
interval).
Strong provable statements on the security of the standard CRT secret-sharing scheme
have been recently obtained by Quisquater et al. [19], improving on previous results
by Goldreich et al. [8]. Our proven security result for the changeable-threshold variant
of the standard CRT scheme uses entirely different techniques. Although our security
result for the changeable-threshold CRT scheme is not as strong as those obtained in
[19] for the standard CRT scheme, we believe it is still sufﬁcient for many applications.
We would like to remark on the relation between our threshold increase method
and the method for making secret-sharing schemes robust against cheating shareholders
using error-correction [17]. In both methods, the share combiner (for a scheme with
threshold t) receives t ′ > t ‘noisy’ shares and applies an error-correction algorithm to
overcome the noise and recover the secret. However, the type of noise which needs to
be corrected (and hence also the decoding algorithm) is inherently different in the two
cases. In the cheater robustness case, the noise vector (whose ith entry is the additive
error in the ith share) is bounded in the Hamming norm: if the number of cheating
shareholders is at most k then we know that up to k of the t ′ shares will be arbitrarily
corrupted while the remaining shares will be correct. In our threshold increase case,
the noise vector is bounded in the Lee norm: we have that all t ′ shares are corrupted
but only by a small (in absolute value) additive noise. Note that a Hamming-bounded
noise is not suitable for our threshold-increase method: we require that all shares be
corrupted in an identical manner, to ensure that any subset of t shareholders cannot
obtain information on the secret, and any subset of t ′ > t shareholders can recover
the secret. On the other hand, our Lee-bounded noise error-correction method cannot
handle the Hamming-bounded noise where some shares are arbitrarily corrupted.
Chinese Remainder codes are well known in communication applications as error-
correction codes [7]. As mentioned above, our share combiner algorithm (and the
related algorithm of [22]) can be viewed as an error-correction algorithm for a Chinese
Remainder code variant, correcting noise bounded in the Lee norm. However, we are
not aware of communication applications for this type of error-correction. In such
applications the Hamming-bounded noise seems more relevant. Appropriate Hamming-
bounded noise error-correction algorithms for Chinese Remainder Codes are discussed
in [8,5].
Finally, we remark that in a companion paper [23], we show that lattice-based meth-
ods can also be used to change the threshold of the standard Shamir [21] polynomial-
based secret-sharing scheme. The general ideas and results obtained for the Shamir
scheme are analogous to those obtained here for the CRT scheme, although they differ
in the details of the lattices involved.
Organization of this paper: Section 2 presents deﬁnitions and known results on
lattices, and a number-theoretic lemma that we use. In Section 3, we provide deﬁnitions
of changeable-threshold secret-sharing schemes and their correctness/security notions.
In Section 4 we present the original CRT (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme, and
our threshold-changing algorithms to increase the threshold to t ′ > t . We then provide
concrete proofs of the correctness and security properties of our scheme. To improve
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the readability of the paper, proofs of some lemmas have been omitted from the main
text and included in the Appendix.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation
Lee Norm ‖ · ‖L,p: For a prime p and an integer z we denote Lee norm of z modulo
p as ‖z‖L,p = mink∈Z |z − kp|. More generally, given a vector of n primes p =
(p1, . . . , pn), we denote the Lee norm of z modulo p by ‖z‖L,p = max1 in ‖z‖L,pi .
Inﬁnity Norm ‖ · ‖∞: For a vector z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Qn, we denote the inﬁnity
norm of z by ‖z‖∞ = max1 in |zi |.
Sets: For a set S, we denote by #S the size of S. For any set S and integer n,
we denote by Sn the set of all n-tuples of elements from S and by D(Sn) the set
of all n-tuples of distinct elements from S. For integer n, we denote by [n] the set
{1, 2, . . . , n}.
2.2. Lattices
Here we collect several known results that we use about lattices, which can be found
in [10,11,9]. Let {b1, . . . ,bn} be a set of n linearly independent vectors in Rn. The set
L = {z: z = c1b1 + · · · + cnbn, c1, . . . , cn ∈ Z}
is called an n-dimensional (full-rank) lattice with basis {b1, . . . ,bn}. Given a basis
B = (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Rn for a lattice L, we deﬁne the associated basis matrix ML,B to
be the (full-rank) n×n matrix whose ith row is the ith basis vector bi for i = 1, . . . , n.
The quantity |det(ML,B)| is called the determinant of the lattice L and is denoted by
det(L). Although a given lattice L has an inﬁnite number of bases B, the lattice
determinant det(L) is independent of the choice of B (i.e. the absolute value of the
determinant of any basis matrix of L is equal to det(L)).
Given a lattice L, the problem of ﬁnding a shortest vector in a lattice which is known
as the shortest vector problem, or SVP. An algorithm is called a SVP approximation
algorithm with ‖ · ‖∞-approximation factor SVP if it is guaranteed to ﬁnd a lattice
vector such that ‖v‖∞SVP minv∈L ‖v‖∞. The celebrated LLL algorithm of Lenstra et
al. [12] is a polynomial time SVP approximation algorithm with ‖ · ‖∞-approximation
factor LLL = n1/22n/2.
In this paper, we actually need to solve a variation of SVP called the closest vector
problem (CVP): given a basis of a lattice L in Rn and a “target” vector t ∈ Rn, ﬁnd
a lattice vector v such that ‖v − t‖∞ is minimized. An algorithm is called a CVP
approximation algorithm with ‖ · ‖∞-approximation factor CVP if it is guaranteed to
ﬁnd a lattice vector such that ‖v−t‖∞CVP minv∈L ‖v−t‖. Babai [2] has shown how
to convert the LLL algorithm into a polynomial time CVP approximation algorithm with
‖·‖∞-approximation factor Bab = n1/22n/2. This algorithm sufﬁces for our application.
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We need the following deﬁnition of successive Minkowski minima of a lattice:
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Minkowski minima). Let L be a lattice in Rn. For i = 1, . . . , n, the
ith successive Minkowski minimum of L, denoted i (L), is the smallest real number
such that there exists a set {b1, . . . ,bi} of i linearly-independent vectors in L with
‖bj‖∞i (L) for all j = 1, . . . , i.
Note that 1(L) is just the shortest inﬁnity-norm over all non-zero vectors in L.
A classical result is Minkowski’s “ﬁrst theorem” in the geometry of numbers.
Theorem 2.1 (Minkowski’s ﬁrst theorem). Let L be a lattice in Rn and let 1(L) de-
note the ﬁrst Minkowski minimum of L (see Deﬁnition 2.1). Then 1(L)det(L) 1n .
The following is a generalization of Minkowski’s “ﬁrst theorem”, which is due to
Blichfeldt and van der Corput (see [10]). The original theorem is general and lower
bounds the number of lattice points in any origin-symmetric convex set. However, for
our purposes the following special case is sufﬁcient.
Theorem 2.2 (Blichfeldt-Corput). Let L be a lattice in Rn and let K denote the origin-
centered box {v ∈ Rn : ‖v‖∞ < H } of volume Vol(K) = (2H)n. Then the number of
points of the lattice L contained in the box K is at least 2·Int
(
Vol(K)
2n det(L)
)
+ 1, where
for any z ∈ R, Int(z) denotes the largest integer which is strictly less than z.
We will also use the following version of Minkowski’s “second theorem” in the
geometry of numbers [10]. Similarly to above, it is in fact also a special case of the
original theorem.
Theorem 2.3 (Minkowski’s second theorem). Let L be a lattice in Rn and let 1(L),
. . . , n(L) denote the n Minkowski minima of L (see Deﬁnition 2.1). Then 1(L) · · · n
(L)2n det(L).
2.3. A number-theoretic lemma
The following is a fundamental lemma that we use, interestingly, for both the cor-
rectness and security proofs of our CRT construction. The lemma gives an upper bound
on the probability that, for n randomly chosen primes (p1, . . . , pn), there will exist a
“small” non-trivial integer z (0 < z < Â) such that the integer B·z has “small” residues
modulo all the primes p1, . . . , pn (‖B·z‖L,pi < H for all i = 1, . . . , n), where BH
is a ﬁxed integer. This lemma is a slight variant of a similar result due to Shparlinski
and Steinfeld [22].
Lemma 2.1. Let P denote a set of primes all exceeding 2. Fix integers Â, Ĥ ∈ ZÂ
and B̂Ĥ . Let E,n(Â, Ĥ , B̂) ⊆ Pn denote the set of n-component prime vectors
p = (p1, . . . , pn) such that there exists z ∈ ZÂ\{0} with ‖B̂·z‖L,p < Ĥ . The size of
R. Steinfeld et al. / Finite Fields and Their Applications 12 (2006) 653–680 659
the set E,n(Â, Ĥ , B̂) is upper bounded as follows:
#E,n(Â, Ĥ , B̂)Â
(
2Ĥ log(B̂Â + Ĥ )

)n
.
Proof. Suppose that p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Pn is such that there exists z ∈ Z such that
0 < z < Â and ‖B̂·z‖L,p < Ĥ . (1)
Then, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists i ∈ Z such |i | < Ĥ and pi divides
B̂·z + i . It follows that pi ∈ Sz for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where Sz is the set of prime
divisors in P of all integers in the interval I (z, Ĥ ) = [B̂·z− (Ĥ − 1), B̂·z+ (Ĥ − 1)].
Observe that I (z, Ĥ ) contains less than 2Ĥ integers, all upper bounded by B̂·Â + Ĥ ,
and we also know that 0 /∈ I (z, Ĥ ) because B̂Ĥ . Hence, using the fact that all
primes in P exceed 2, we ﬁnd that each integer in I (z,H) is divisible by at most
−1 log(B̂·Â + Ĥ ) primes from P, and we have #Sz < 2Ĥ −1 log(B̂·Â + Ĥ ).
So for each possible choice of z ∈ ZÂ\{0}, there are less than (2Ĥ −1 log(B̂·Â+Ĥ ))n
“bad” choices for p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Pn such that (1) is satisﬁed. Since there are less
than Â possible values for z, we get the desired bound on the number #E,n(Â, Ĥ , B̂)
of “bad” vectors p. 
3. Deﬁnition of changeable-threshold secret-sharing schemes
We will use the following deﬁnition of a threshold secret-sharing scheme, which is
a slight modiﬁcation of the deﬁnition in [19].
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Threshold scheme). A (t, n)-threshold secret-sharing scheme TSS
= (GC,D,C) consists of three (possibly probabilistic) efﬁcient algorithms:
(1) GC (Public parameter generation): Takes as input a security parameter k ∈ N and
returns a string x ∈ X of public parameters.
(2) D (Dealer setup): Takes as input a security/public parameter pair (k, x) and a
secret s from the secret space S(k, x) ⊆ {0, 1}k and returns a list of n shares
s = (s1, . . . , sn), where si is in the ith share space Si (k, x) for i = 1, . . . , n. We
denote by
Dk,x(., .) : S(k, x) × R(k, x) → S1(k, x) × · · · × Sn(k, x)
the mapping induced by algorithm D (here R(k, x) denotes the space of random
inputs to the probabilistic algorithm D).
(3) C (Share combiner): Takes as input a security/public parameter pair (k, x) and any
subset sI = (si : i ∈ I ) of t out of the n shares, and returns a recovered secret
s ∈ S(k, x) (here I denotes a subset of [n] of size #I = t).
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The correctness, communication efﬁciency, and security properties of a (t, n)-threshold
secret-sharing scheme can be quantiﬁed by the following deﬁnitions, which are modi-
ﬁcations of those in [19].
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Correctness, efﬁciency, security). A (t, n) threshold secret-sharing
scheme TSS = (GC,D,C) is said to be:
(1) c-correct: If the secret recovery failure probability pf is at most c, where
pf
def= Pr
x=GC(k)∈X
[Ck,x(sI ) = s for some (s, r) ∈ S(k, x) × R(k, x) and
I ⊆ [n] : s = Dk,x(s, r)],
and we deﬁne sI
def={si : i ∈ I } for each share vector s = (s1, . . . , sn) and subset
I ⊆ [n].
We say that TSS is asymptotically correct if, for any  > 0, there exists k0 ∈ N
such that TSS is -correct for all k > k0.
(2) e-efﬁcient: If the (maximal) ratio of share length to secret length is at most e,
that is
log(#Si (k, x))
log(#S(k, x)) e,
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
(3) (ts, s , s)-secure with respect to the secret probability distribution Pk,x on S(k, x):
If, with probability at least 1−s over the choice of public parameters x = GC(k),
the worst-case secret entropy loss for any ts observed shares is at most s , that is
|Lk,x(sI )|def=|H(s ∈ S(k, x)) − H(s ∈ S(k, x)|sI )| < s ,
for all s ∈ S1(k, x) × · · · × Sn(k, x) and I ⊆ [n] with #I ts . We say that TSS
is asymptotically ts-secure with respect to Pk,x if, for any  > 0 and ′ > 0 there
exists k0 ∈ N such that TSS is (ts, ′, ·k)-secure with respect to Pk,x for all
k > k0.
The following deﬁnition of the Threshold Changeability without dealer assistance for
a secret sharing scheme is a modiﬁcation of the deﬁnition in [15].
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Threshold-changeability). A (t, n)-threshold secret-sharing scheme TSS
= (GC,D,C) is called threshold-changeable to t ′ with c-correctness, e-efﬁciency and
(ts, s , s)-security with respect to secret distribution Px,k , if there exist n efﬁcient
sub-share generation algorithms Hi : Si (k, x) → Ti (k, x) for i = 1, . . . , n, and an
efﬁcient sub-share combination algorithm C’ such that the modiﬁed (t ′, n)-threshold
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scheme TSS′ = (GC,D′,C′), with modiﬁed shares
D′k,x(s, x)
def= (H1(s1), . . . ,Hn(sn)) ∈ T1(k, x) × · · · Tn(k, x), with
(s1, . . . , sn) = Dk,x(s, x),
is c-correct, e-efﬁcient and (ts, s , s)-secure with respect to Pk,x . TSS is called
asymptotically threshold-changeable to (ts, t ′) with respect to Pk,x if there exist algo-
rithms Hi : Si (k, x) → Ti (k, x) (i = 1, . . . , n) and C’ such that the (t ′, n)-threshold
scheme TSS’ deﬁned above is asymptotically correct and asymptotically ts-secure with
respect to Pk,x .
Remark (c-correctness of a (t, n) scheme). The c-correctness requirement, although
probabilistic, is quite strong since it is only probabilistic in the choice of public param-
eter x: With at least 1 − c probability, the algorithm GC will output a ‘good’ scheme
parameter x for which the scheme reconstruction works perfectly, i.e. for such x the
secret is guaranteed to always be recovered by the combiner from any t shares.
Remark ((ts, s , s)-security). The (ts, s , s) requirement guarantees that with at least
1 − s probability, GC will output a ‘good’ scheme parameter x for which any ts
observed shares sI leak at most Lk,x(sI ) < s bits of entropy of the secret s. Note
that: (1) As for correctness above, in our scheme we can efﬁciently verify that an x is
good, so s need not be negligible, (2) The requirement that Lk,x(sI ) < s for all sI ,
is a worst-case requirement and hence much stronger than simply requiring that the
average value of Lk,x(sI ) is less than s , and (3) Assuming the entropy of the secret
space is at least k bits, the asymptotic ts-security requirement says that the fraction
s/k of the secret entropy lost can be made as small as we wish with a suitably large
security parameter k.
4. Threshold-changeability for integer-CRT secret-sharing
4.1. The standard integer-CRT scheme
The standard integer-CRT (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is deﬁned as follows:
(t, n)-Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme CRTTSS = (GC,D,C)
(1) GC(k) (Public parameter generation): Pick a (not necessarily random) prime p0
from the interval [2k−1, 2k]. Generate n distinct random primes p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈
D(Pnk ), where Pk denotes the set of primes in the interval [2k, 2k+1] (note that
pi > p0 for all i ∈ [n]). The public parameter string is x = (p0,p). The secret
space is S(k, x) = Zp0 . The share spaces are Si (k, x) = Zpi for i = 1, . . . , n.
The dealer randomness space is R(k, x) = ZPt−1 , where Pt−1 is the product of the
t − 1 smallest primes among (p1, . . . , pn).
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(2) Dk,x(s, r) (Dealer setup): To share secret s ∈ Zp0 , choose a uniformly random
r ∈ ZPt−1 and compute the integer a = s + r·p0. The ith share is si = a mod pi
for i = 1, . . . , n.
(3) Ck,x(sI ) (Share combiner): To combine shares sI = (si : i ∈ I ) for some I ⊆ [n]
with #I = t , compute by Chinese Remaindering the unique b ∈ Z∏
i∈I pi such that
b ≡ si (mod pi) for all i ∈ I . The recovered secret is s = bmod p0.
4.2. Threshold-changing algorithms
Our threshold-changing subshare generation and combination algorithms to change
the (t, n)-threshold scheme CRTTSS = (GC,D,C) into a (t ′, n)-threshold scheme
CRTTSS’ = (GC,D’,C’) are deﬁned as follows. Note that the subshare combiner algo-
rithm uses an efﬁcient CVP approximation algorithm ACVP with ‖ · ‖∞-approximation
factor CVP. We deﬁne CVP = log(
⌈
CVP + 1
⌉
) (if we use the Babai poly-time CVP
algorithm, we have CVP1 + 0.5(t ′ + 1 + log(t ′ + 1))).
Changing Threshold to t ′ > t
(1) Hi (si) (ith subshare generation): To transform share si ∈ Zp of original (t, n)-
threshold scheme into subshare ti ∈ Zp of desired (t ′, n)-threshold scheme (t ′ > t)
the ith shareholder does the following (for all i = 1, . . . , n):
(a) Determine noise bound H which guarantees c-correctness:
(i) Set H = max(
2·k−1, 1) with
(ii)  = 1 − 1+F
(t ′/t) > 0 (noise bitlength fraction) and
(iii) F =
(
t ′/t
k
) (
log(−1/t ′c n(kt + CVP)) + 2CVP + 5
)
.
(b) Compute Hi (si) = ti = B·si + ri mod pi ∈ Zpi for a uniformly random integer
ri with |ri | < H , where B = 2CVPH ∈ Z.
(2) C’k,x(tI ): To combine subshares tI = (ti : i ∈ I ) for some I = {i[1], . . . , i[t ′]} ⊆
[n] with #I = t ′, do the following:
(a) Build the following (t ′ + 1)× (t ′ + 1) matrix MLCRT(pI ,B,H,A), whose rows form
a basis for a full-rank lattice LCRT(pI , B,H,A) in Qt ′+1:
MLCRT(pI ,B,H,A) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
pi[1] 0 . . . 0 0
0 pi[2] . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . pi[t ′] 0
B B . . . B H/A
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (2)
Here H=max(
2·k−1, 1),  = 1− 1+F
(t ′/t) , F=
(
t ′/t
k
) (
log(−1/t ′c n(kt+CVP))
+2CVP + 5), B = 2CVPH , and A = p0Pt−1, where Pt−1 is the product of the
t − 1 smallest primes among (p1, . . . , pn).
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(b) Deﬁne t = (ti[1], . . . , ti[t ′], 0) ∈ Zt ′+1.
(c) Run the CVP approximation algorithm ACVP on the lattice LCRT(pI , B,H,A)
given by MLCRT(pI ,B,H,A) and the target vector t. Denote by c = (c1, . . . , ct ′ ,
ct ′+1) ∈ Qt ′+1 the output vector returned by the algorithm, which approximates
the closest vector to t in the lattice LCRT(pI , B,H,A).
(d) Compute â = (A/H)·ct ′+1 ∈ Z. The recovered secret is ŝ = â mod p0.
Remark 1. The reason for multiplying the shares si by the integer B(CVP + 1)H
before adding the noise, is that otherwise, the secret may not be uniquely recoverable
from the noisy subshares.
Remark 2. It is not difﬁcult to see that our method of adding a ‘small’ random noise
integer ri with |ri | < H to the share multiple Ba modulo each prime pi , is essentially
equivalent (in the sense of information on the secret) to passing the residues Ba mod pi
through a deterministic function which chops off the log(2H) ≈ ·k least-signiﬁcant
bits of the k-bit residues Bamod pi , and this also yields shorter subshares than in our
method above, yielding (1 − )-efﬁciency, instead of 1-efﬁciency as above. However,
since reducing the length of the original shares is not our main goal, we have chosen
to present our scheme as above since it simpliﬁes the analysis of our scheme, and also
allows for more ﬁne control over the ‘noise’ bound.
4.3. Correctness
The following is a concrete statement of correctness for our scheme. It shows that
the choice of the parameter F in our scheme sufﬁces to achieve c-correctness for all
sufﬁciently large security parameters k.
Theorem 4.1 (Correctness). The scheme CRTTSS’ (with parameter choice c = k−t ′ )
is asymptotically correct. Concretely, the (t ′, n) scheme CRTTSS’ is c-correct as long
as the security parameter k satisﬁes the inequality
k
(
t ′/t
t ′/t − 1
)(
log(−1/t ′c n(kt + CVP)) + 2CVP + 6
)
.
Proof. Let x = (p0,p) be a vector of primes which determines an instance of CRTTSS.
For a subset I = {i[1], . . . , i[t ′]} ⊆ [n] of size #I = t ′, we say that p is bad with
respect to I if there exists a secret s ∈ Sk,x = Zp0 and randomness r ∈ ZPt−1 and
r
def= (ri[1], . . . , ri[t ′]) ∈ (−H,H)t ′ for D’k,x such that C’k,x fails to recover the secret s
from the given subshare vector tI = D’k,x(s, (r, r)) = (B·a + ri[1] mod pi[1], . . . , B·a +
ri[t ′] mod pi[t ′]), where a = s + r·p0 ∈ ZA, A = p0Pt−1 and Pt−1 is the product of the
t − 1 smallest primes in p. We say that p is bad if there exists I ⊆ [n] of size #I = t ′
such that p is bad with respect to I.
Observe that the failure probability pf in the correctness Deﬁnition 3.2 is exactly
the probability that a prime vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) chosen uniformly at random
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from the set D(Pnk ) is bad. We now deduce an upper bound on the fraction  of
bad vectors in D(Pnk ) as a function of the scheme parameters. Suppose that p is bad
with respect to some I ∈ [n] with #I = t ′. This means that there exist a ∈ ZA and
r = (ri[1], . . . , ri[t ′]) ∈ (−H,H)t ′ such that C’ returns the wrong secret ŝ = â mod p0 =
a mod p0
def= s on input
tI = (t1, . . . , tt ′) = (B·a + ri[1] − k1pi[1], . . . , B·a + ri[t ′] − kt ′pi[t ′]) (3)
for some vector k = (k1, . . . , kt ′) ∈ Zt ′ . But this means that
â = (A/H)ct ′+1 /≡ (A/H)a (mod p0), (4)
where
c = (c1, . . . , ct ′+1) =
(
B ·̂a − k̂i[1]pi[1], . . . , B ·̂a − k̂i[t ′]pi[t ′], â
A
H
)
(5)
is the vector returned by ACVP on input the lattice LCRT(pI , B,H,A) with target vector
tI = (t1, . . . , tt ′ , 0), and
ak = (a1, . . . , at ′+1)def=
(
B·a − k1pi[1], . . . , B·a − kt ′pi[t ′], a
A
H
)
,
is the lattice vector in LCRT corresponding to a = s + r·p0, which satisﬁes
‖ak − tI‖∞ =
∥∥∥(ri[1], . . . , ri[t ′], a
A
H
)∥∥∥∞ < H, (6)
using a < A and |ri[j ]| < H for all j = 1, . . . , t ′. Since ACVP is a CVP approximation
algorithm with ‖.‖∞-approximation factor CVP, the lattice vector c which it returns
satisﬁes
‖c − tI‖∞ < CVP·H. (7)
Applying the triangle inequality, it follows from (6) and (7) that the lattice vector
z = c − ak = (z1, . . . , zt ′+1) is ‘short’, namely ‖z‖∞ < (CVP + 1)H , but is non-zero,
namely zt ′+1 = 0 (using (4)). We conclude that if p is bad with respect to I then there
exists an integer zdef=| A
H
zt ′+1| which satisﬁes both
0 < |z| < (CVP + 1)A2CVP+(k+1)·t def= Â
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and
‖B·z‖L,pI < 2CVPH def= Ĥ ,
where pI
def= (pi[1], . . . , pi[t ′]) and B = 2CVPH = Ĥ .
It now follows from Lemma 2.1 that there is a fraction of at most #Ek,t ′(Â, Ĥ , B)/#D
(P t ′k )Â(2Ĥ log(BÂ+Ĥ )k−1)t
′
/#D(P t ′k ) choices for pI ∈ P t
′
k such that p is bad with
respect to I. Since there are
(
n
t ′
)
possible choices for I, we have that the fraction  of
bad vectors in D(Pnk ) is upper bounded as

(
n
t ′
)
Â
(
2Ĥ log(BÂ + Ĥ )k−1)t ′
#D(P t ′k )
. (8)
It is known [20] that the number of primes #Pk in the interval [2k, 2k+1] is lower
bounded as
#Pk2k−1/k for all k5. (9)
Also, we have
#P t ′k
#D(P t ′k )
=
(
#Pk
#Pk
)
·
(
#Pk
#Pk − 1
)
· · ·
(
#Pk
#Pk − (t ′ − 1)
)
2t ′ , (10)
as long as the condition #Pk − (t ′ − 1)#Pk/2 holds, which using (9) is implied by
the condition
k − log k log t ′ + 2. (11)
Plugging (9) and (10) in (8) we ﬁnd, assuming (11), the following sufﬁcient condition
for having c (i.e. c-correctness):
2t ′
(
n
t ′
)
Â(2Ĥ log(B̂Â + Ĥ )k−1]t ′
(2k−1k−1)t ′
c. (12)
Now, using B̂Â + Ĥ = (Â + 1)Ĥ2ÂĤ (since Â1) and assuming the condition
2·k−11, (13)
so that H = 2·k−1, condition (12) becomes 22t ′+t+(t ′+1)CVP(n
t ′
)
((t + )k + 2CVP +
t)t
′2((1−)t ′−t)·kc. Using  < 1, 1t ′ log(
(
n
t ′
)
−1c ) log(−1c n), (2t ′+t+(t ′+1)CVP)/t ′
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2CVP + 3 (since t/t ′1 and t ′1), and log((t + 1)(k + 1) + 2CVP) log(4kt +
2CVP)2 + log(kt + CVP) (using t1 and k1), we ﬁnally get the following
sufﬁcient condition for c-correctness (assuming k5, (11) and (13)):
F 
(
t ′/t
k
)(
log(−1/t ′c n(kt + CVP)) + 2CVP + 5
)
. (14)
Condition (14) is satisﬁed by the scheme parameter choice F = ( t ′/tk )(log(−1/t
′
c n(kt+
CVP))+2CVP+5). Substituting this value of F in (13) (recalling that  = 1− 1+Ft ′/t ),
we see that (13) is equivalent to the claimed inequality
k
(
t ′/t
t ′/t − 1
)(
log(−1/t ′c n(kt + CVP)) + 2CVP + 6
)
. (15)
Finally we observe, using t ′/t > 1 that (15) implies that k− log k log n+ ( t ′/t
t ′/t−1 )(log
(−1/t ′c t) + 6) log t ′ + 2 so that k5 and (11) are both implied by (15). Finally, to
establish the claimed asymptotic correctness, we observe that with c = k−t ′ = o(1),
the right-hand side of (15) is O(log k) so, since log k = o(k), (15) is satisﬁed for all
sufﬁciently large k. This completes the proof. 
4.4. Security
The concrete security of our scheme is given by the following result. It shows that,
for ﬁxed (t ′, n), and with c = s = k−t ′ = o(1), our (t ′, n) scheme leaks at most
fraction o(1) of the entropy of the secret as long as less than t ′ − t ′/t subshares are
observed by the attacker. For example if we increase the threshold from t to t ′ = 2t ,
then we have almost perfect security as long as ts < t ′ − t ′/t = t ′ − 2 shares are
observed by the attacker (we can of course choose a slightly larger t ′ ≈ 2t + 2 if
we want to guarantee security against attackers observing up to 2t shares, but then to
guarantee reconstruction we would need 2t + 2 subshares to be combined).
We remark that the limitation ts t ′ − t ′/t for security is inherent to our approach
of adding noise to the subshares and not to our CRT-based implementation. This is
because, as noted in Section 4, our approach of increasing the threshold from t to
t ′ = R′·t by adding about (1 − 1/R′)k bits of noise to shares is essentially equivalent
to reducing the length of shares by a factor R′. Thus each subshare can provide at most
k/R′ bits of information on the secret and since t ′ subshares contain all the information
on the secret, it follows that perfect security cannot be achieved when ts > t ′ − R′
subshares are observed.
We also remark that although we state in Theorem 4.2 a lower bound on the condi-
tional Shannon entropy of the secret H(s ∈ S(k, x)|sI ) for any observed share value
sI , our proof shows the stronger result that the stated bound is also a lower bound
on the conditional min-entropy H∞(s ∈ S(k, x)|sI ) = log(1/maxs∈S(k,x) Pk,x(s|sI ))
(where Pk,x(s|sI ) denotes the conditional probability distribution of s given sI ), and
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hence also a lower bound on the conditional Rényi entropy of s given sI . This means
we can apply the privacy ampliﬁcation results of [3] to derive a secret s′ (by hashing
s with a public randomly chosen function from a universal hash family) such that a
provably negligible absolute amount of entropy of s′ is leaked by the observed shares
sI .
Note that for improved readability of the proof of Theorem 4.2, the proofs of some
lemmas have been placed in the Appendix.
Theorem 4.2 (Security). The scheme CRTTSS’ (with c = k−t ′ ) is asymptotically
Int(t ′ − t ′/t)-secure with respect to the uniform secret distribution s ∈ Zp0 . Concretely,
scheme CRTTSS’ is (ts, s , s)-secure, with:
ts = t
′ − t ′/t
1 + F =
t ′ − t ′/t
1 +
(
t ′/t
k
)

,
s = c, s = max(( + 4)(ts + 1), t + 1),
assuming that the security parameter k satisﬁes the inequality
k max
(
t ′/t
t ′/t − 1 ( + (ts + 1) + t + 1) , ( + 3)(ts + 1)
2 + 1
)
. (16)
Here
 = log(−1/t ′c n(kt + CVP)) + 2CVP + 5
and
 = log(2
−1
c
(
n
ts
)
)
ts + 1 + log(4kt + CVP + 1) + 5.
Proof. Let x = (p0,p) denote the scheme public parameters, where p = (p1, . . . , pn).
Fix I = {i[1], . . . , i[ts]} ⊆ [n] with #I = ts , and let sI = (si[1], . . . , si[ts ]) ∈ Zpi[1] ×
· · · × Zpi[ts ] be an observed subshare vector. The subshares are given by
si[j ] = B·a + ri[j ] mod pi[j ] for j = 1, . . . , ts ,
where a = s + r·p0 is uniformly distributed on ZA.
It follows from the above that the conditional probability Pk,x(s|sI ) of the secret
taking the value s ∈ Zp0 given the observed sub-share vector sI is given by
Pk,x(s|sI ) =
#{(a, rI ) ∈ ZA × (−H,H)ts : B·a + ri[j ] ≡ si[j ] (mod pi[j ])∀j ∈ [ts ] and a ≡ s (mod p0)}
#{(a, rI ) ∈ ZA × (−H,H)ts : B·a + ri[j ] ≡ si[j ] (mod pi[j ])∀j ∈ [ts ]} .
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Using the fact that for each a ∈ ZA there is at most one rI ∈ (−H,H)ts such that
B·a + ri[j ] ≡ si[j ] (mod pi[j ]) for all j ∈ [ts], the above simpliﬁes to
Pk,x(s|sI ) = #Ss,p0(pI , A, B,H)#S0,1(pI , A, B,H) , (17)
where for integers (̂s, p̂0) we deﬁne the set Ŝs,p̂0 by
Ŝs,p̂0(pI , A, B,H, sI )
def={a ∈ ZA : ‖B·a − si[j ]‖L,pi[j ] < H ∀j ∈ [ts] and a ≡ ŝ (mod p̂0)}.
We will derive a probabilistic lower bound on #S0,1 and upper bound on #Ss,p0 which
both hold for all except a fraction I s/
(
n
ts
)
of ‘bad’ choices for pI ∈ D((Pk)ts )
assuming k satisﬁes inequality (16) (with ts and s deﬁned in the theorem statement).
We then apply these bounds to (17) to get a bound Pk,x(s|sI )2s /p0 for all s (with
s deﬁned in the theorem statement) so that for ﬁxed I, entropy loss is bounded as
Lk,x(sI )s , except for fraction I of pI ∈ D((Pk)ts ). It then follows that Lk,x(sI )s
for all I ⊆ [n] with #I = ts except for a fraction 
(
n
ts
)
I s of p ∈ D((Pk)n)
assuming that k satisﬁes (16), which proves the theorem.
Reduction to lattice point counting: It remains to derive lower and upper bounds on
the size of the set Ŝs,p̂0 . The following lemma reduces this problem to ﬁnding lower
and upper bounds on the number of points #V̂s,p̂0 of a certain lattice in a certain box.
Lemma 4.1. Let A,B,H be positive integers, pI = (pi[1], . . . , pi[ts ]) a vector of
primes greater or equal to 2H , sI = (si[1], . . . , si[ts ]) ∈ Zts , p̂0 ∈ Z a positive di-
visor of A, and ŝ ∈ Zp̂0 . Let LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0) denote the full-rank lattice in
Qts+1 with basis consisting of the rows of the matrix
MCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0)
def=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
pi[1] 0 . . . 0 0
0 pi[2] . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . pi[ts ] 0
B·p̂0 B·p̂0 . . . B·p̂0 2HA/p̂0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
and deﬁne the vector
ŝI
def=
(
si[1] − B ·̂s, . . . , si[ts ] − B ·̂s,H ·
A/p̂0 − 1
A/p̂0
)
∈ Qts+1.
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Then the sizes of the following two sets are equal:
Ŝs,p̂0(pI , A, B,H, sI )
def={a ∈ ZA : ‖B·a − si[j ]‖L,pi[j ] < H ∀j ∈ [ts] and a ≡ ŝ (mod p̂0)}
and
V̂s,p̂0(pI , A, B,H, ŝI )
def={v ∈ LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0) : ‖v − ŝI‖∞ < H }.
Finding a lower bound on #V0,1: We reduce the “non-homogenous” problem of lower
bounding the number #V̂s,p̂0(pI , A, B,H, ŝI ) of points of the lattice LCRT(pI , A, B,
H, p̂0) in the box TsI (H)
def={v ∈ Qts+1 : ‖v − ŝI‖∞ < H } centered on ŝI (which is in
general not a lattice vector), to
(1) The “homogenous” problem of lower bounding the number of points of the lattice
LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0)) in an origin-centered box of the form T0(H ′)def={v ∈ Qts+1 :
‖v‖∞ < H ′}, and
(2) Finding an upper bound on the (ts+1)th Minkowski minimum ts+1(LCRT(pI , A, B,
H, p̂0)) of the lattice, we will see that this upper bound holds for at least a fraction
1 −  of pI ∈ P ts whenever a certain explicit condition holds.
This reduction can be precisely stated as follows:
Lemma 4.2. With the notation of Lemma 4.1,
#V̂s,p̂0(pI , A, B,H, ŝI )#{v ∈ LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0)) : ‖v‖∞ < H − },
where

(
ts + 1
2
)
ts+1(LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0)).
To solve the “homogenous” problem (1) above we apply the Blichfeldt–Corput
generalization of Minkowski’s “ﬁrst theorem” in the geometry of numbers (Theo-
rem 2.2 in Section 2). Noting that det(LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0)) = PI · 2HA/p̂0 , where PI =∏
j∈[ts ] pi[j ], and the volume of the box {v ∈ Rts+1 : ‖v‖∞ < H − } is [2(H − )]ts+1,
we ﬁnd, using the fact that Int(z)z − 1 for all z ∈ R that,
#{v ∈ LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0) : ‖v‖ < H − } (A/p̂0)(H − )
ts+1/H
PI
− 1. (18)
To solve the second problem (2) above of upper bounding the (ts + 1)th Minkowski
minimum ts+1(LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0)), we apply Minkowski’s “second theorem” in
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the geometry of numbers (Theorem 2.3 in Section 2) to reduce this problem to the
problem of lower bounding the ﬁrst Minkowski minimum 1(LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0)).
Namely, since i (LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0))1(LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0)) for all i ∈ [ts],
then Minkowski’s theorem gives
ts+1(LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0))
2ts+1 det(LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0))
1(LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0))ts . (19)
Lower bounding the ﬁrst Minkowski minimum: By applying the number-theoretic
Lemma 2.1 (Section 2), we obtain the following (probabilistic) lower bound on 1(LCRT
(pI , A, B,H, p̂0)).
Lemma 4.3. Fix positive integers (k, A,B,H, p̂0, ts), and real  > 0 such that k5,
k − log k log ts + 2, p̂0 is a divisor of A, and A/p̂02k2H . If the condition
12−
(
2k·ts2H
A/p̂0
) 1
ts+1
 1
4
min(B, 2k) (20)
holds, then for at least a fraction 1− 2−[−(log log(2k+2 BH A)+5)](ts+1) of pI ∈ D(P tsk ), we
have
1 (LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0)) 2−· det(LCRT (pI , A, B,H, p̂0))
1
ts+1 .
Note that A = p0Pt−1 depends on pI whereas our Lemma 4.3 assumes that A is a
ﬁxed integer. However, it is easy to see that if AL = p02(t−1)k denotes a ﬁxed lower
bound on A then #Ss,p0(pI , A, B,H, sI )Ss,p0(pI , AH ,B,H, sI ). So, ﬁxing  > 0 (to
be determined later) and applying Lemma 4.3 with A = AL and (̂s, p̂0) = (0, 1), we
have, except for a fraction of at most
I (1)2−[−(log log(2
k+2 B
H
AL)+5)](ts+1) (21)
of pI ∈ D(P tsk ) and assuming conditions
12−
(
2kts2H
AL
) 1
ts+1
 1
4
min(B, 2k) (22)
and
k5 and k − log k log ts + 2 (23)
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and
A2k2H, (24)
that 1 (LCRT(pI , A, B,H, 1)) 2−· det(LCRT (pI , A, B,H, 1))
1
ts+1
. The latter bound
and Minkowski’s second theorem give ts+1 (LCRT(pI , A, B,H, 1)) 2(+1)ts+1· det
(LCRT (pI , A, B,H, 1))
1
ts+1 , and so using Lemma 4.2 we have #v0,1(pI )#{v ∈ LCRT
(pI , A, B,H, 1) : ‖v‖∞ < H/2} as long as
ts + 1
2
2(+1)ts+1· det(LCRT (pI , A, B,H, 1))
1
ts+1 H
2
. (25)
Applying the Blichfeldt–Corput theorem to the box {v ∈ Qts+1 : ‖v‖∞ < H/2}, we
get #v0,1(pI )2Int
(
(H/2)ts+1
2ts+1 det(LCRT(pI ,A,B,H,1))
)
+ 1 and using 2Int(z) + 12z − 1z
for all z2, we conclude that
#v0,1(pI )
Hts+1
22(ts+1) det(LCRT(pI , A, B,H, 1))
, (26)
except for a fraction I (1) of pI ∈ D(P tsk ) bounded in (21), and assuming that condi-
tions (22)–(25) hold. Note that condition (24) is satisﬁed because A = p0Pt−1Pt−1
2k assuming t2 (we may assume this because for t = 1, ts = 0 so the theorem is
trivially true), and 2H < 2k2k since 1. Also note that using  > 0 and assuming
ts t (as we will explain below, our analysis need only apply for t ts), we see that
the right-hand inequality in (22) is implied by (25).
Finding an upper bound on #Vs,p0(pI ): We reduce the problem of upper bounding
#Vs,p0(pI , A, B,H, ŝI ) to the problem of lower bounding the ﬁrst Minkowski minimum
1(LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p0)), and then apply Lemma 4.3. The reduction can be stated as
follows:
Lemma 4.4. For any lattice L in Rn, vector s ∈ Rn, and H > 0, we have
#{v ∈ L : ‖v − s‖∞ < H }
[
2H
1(L) + 1
]n
.
Applying Lemma 4.4, we get #V̂s,p̂0(pI , A, B,H, ŝI )
[
4H
1((LCRT(pI ,B·p̂0,2H, Ap̂0 )))
]ts+1
as long as the condition
1(LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p0))2H (27)
672 R. Steinfeld et al. / Finite Fields and Their Applications 12 (2006) 653–680
holds. To apply the lower bound of Lemma 4.3, we let AH = p02(t−1)(k+1) be a ﬁxed
upper bound on A. Then applying the lemma with A = AH and (uhs, p̂0) = (s, p0)
we have, except for at most a fraction
I (p0)2−[−(log log(2
k+2 B
H
AH )+5)](ts+1) (28)
of pI ∈ D(P tsk ), assuming conditions (23) and (24) and
12−
(
2kts2H
AH/p0
) 1
ts+1
 1
4
min(B, 2k) (29)
that 1 (LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p0)) 2−· det(LCRT (pI , A, B,H, p0))
1
ts+1
. Plugging this
into the above upper bound on #V̂s,p̂0 , we obtain
#V̂s,p̂0(pI , A, B,H, ŝI )2(−2)(ts+1)
H ts+1
det(LCRT (pI , A, B,H, p0)) (30)
except for at most a fraction I (p0) of pI ∈ D(P tsk ) bounded in (28) and assuming
conditions (27) and (29). Notice that the left-hand inequality of (29) and (27) are both
implied by the condition
22− det(LCRT (pI , A, B,H, p0))
1
ts+1 H. (31)
Putting it together: Plugging our bounds on #V0,1=#S0,1 and #Vs,p0=#Ss,p0 from
(26) and (30) into (17) we obtain
Pk,x(s|sI )2s /p0 with s = max(( + 4)(ts + 1), t + 1), (32)
as claimed (with  to be determined), for all except at most a fraction I of pI ∈
D(P tsk ), where, using (21) and (28),
I I (1) + I (p0)21−[−(log log(2k+2 BH AH )+5)](ts+1) (33)
and assuming conditions (23), (25), the left-hand inequality in (22), the left-hand in-
equality in (29) and (31). Now recall that to achieve the claimed sc we need to
show that I c
(
n
ts
)−1
. Using the upper bound (33), and recalling that B/H = 2CVP
and AH = p02(t−1)(k+1)2t (k+1) so log(2k+2 BH AH )4kt +CVP + 1, we see that the
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desired bound I c
(
n
ts
)−1 is satisﬁed by choosing
 = log(2
−1
c
(
n
ts
)
)
ts + 1 + log(4kt + CVP + 1) + 5, (34)
as in the theorem statement.
We now show that inequality (16) satisﬁed by k implies the assumed conditions
(23), the left-hand inequality in (22), and the left-hand inequality in (29). To see this,
note that both the left-hand inequality in (22), and the left-hand inequality in (29) are
satisﬁed if
12−
(
2kts2H
p02(t−1)(k+1)
)
. (35)
But assuming
2·k−12 (36)
we have 2H2k−1 and using  = 1 − 1+F
t ′/t , ts t , and the deﬁnition of F =(
t ′/t
k
)
(k) with (k) =
(
log(−1/t ′c n(kt + CVP)) + 2CVP + 5
)
we see after straight-
forward algebraic manipulation that (35) and also (36) and (23) are all satisﬁed as long
as k satisﬁes the inequality
k t
′/t
t ′/t − 1 ((k) + t + 1 + (ts + 1)), (37)
which is implied by (16).
Now we show that the choice of ts = t ′−t ′/t1+F implies that conditions (25) and (31) are
satisﬁed. First, using that det(LCRT (pI , A, B,H, 1))=p−10 det(LCRT (pI , A, B,H, p0)),
we see that (31) implies (25) as long as
2−[(+1)ts+log(ts+1)+1](ts+1)p02(−2)(ts+1). (38)
Using p02k−1, log(ts + 1) ts + 1 (since ts1), we ﬁnd that (38) is implied by
k(+ 3)(ts + 1)2 + 1, which is in turn implied by (16). Now, (31) is implied by the
condition PI,max2H
AL/p0
2(−2)(ts+1)H ts+1, where PI,max = 2(k+1)ts is an upper bound on
PI and AL = p02(t−1)k is a lower bound on A. Using (36), we have H2k−2 and
so (31) is satisﬁed as long as 2(k+1)ts−(t−1)k+12(−2)(ts+1)+(k−2)ts . Rearranging the
last inequality gives the sufﬁcient condition (1 −  − −5
k
)ts t − 1 + −1k , and using
1 −  = 1+F
t ′/t and 0 <
−5
k
 1+F
t ′/t (where the last inequality follows from the choice
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of  and k satisfying (34) and (37)), we conclude that both (25) and (31) are satisﬁed
as long as
ts
t ′ − t ′/t
1 + F , (39)
which is satisﬁed by the theorem hypothesis ts = t ′−t ′/t1+F .
This completes the proof of the claimed values for (ts, s , s) and the inequality
for k. However, note that our arguments above also assumed that ts = t ′−t ′/t1+F  t .
For the case ts < t , we can apply the security bound in [19] for the standard CRT
secret-sharing scheme. This bound gives s log(2p0/C(I)) for any I ⊆ [n] with
#I = ts < t , where C(I) = 
 Pt−1∏
∈I p
. Using Pt−12(t−1)k and ∏∈I p2(t−1)(k+1),
we get C(I)
p0/2t−1p0/2t assuming k t +1 (which is implied by (16)). So for
ts < t , we have s log(2p0/(p0/2t )) t + 1, so our claimed bound s = max(( +
4)(ts + 1), t + 1) holds also for ts < t (for all public parameters).
Finally, to establish the asymptotic security claim, note that when c = k−c for
some constant c > 0, we get  = O(log k) and  = O(log k), so (16) is satisﬁed for
sufﬁciently large k and s = O(log k) so the fraction of lost entropy s/k = o(1). This
completes the proof of the theorem. 
An immediate consequence of the above results is the following.
Corollary 4.1. The standard (t, n) CRT threshold secret-sharing scheme CRTTSS is
asymptotically threshold-changeable to (Int(t ′ − t ′/t), t ′) for any t ′ > t , where Int(z)
denotes the largest integer strictly less than z.
5. Conclusion
We have shown an application of lattice theory to enable threshold-changeability
of CRT secret-sharing schemes. Our results are analogous to those obtained by lat-
tice methods for the polynomial-based Shamir secret-sharing scheme [23], despite the
differences in the details of the lattices involved.
There are several open problems related to our scheme. The ﬁrst is to improve
our security bounds. Another problem is to extend the application of our ‘noisy’ Chi-
nese remaindering decoding algorithm. One possible extension is to the method to
detecting/identifying cheating shareholders who provide incorrect shares to the share
combiner algorithm. A known approach [17] to cheater detection involves using ex-
tra ‘redundant’ shares: the combiner for a (t, n) scheme asks for t ′ > t shares. For
the CRT secret-sharing scheme, the problem of detecting/correcting up to k incorrect
shares is equivalent to error detection/correction for a Chinese Remainder code, where
the share error vector has Hamming weight at most k. The cheating detection problem
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for k t ′−t cheaters can be efﬁciently solved for both the original CRT scheme as well
as our threshold-changeable version of it: the combiner applies the (t, n) reconstruction
algorithm to any subset of t shares out of the t ′ received shares to recover the integer a
and then checks that all t ′ received shares are consistent (for our changeable threshold
scheme this means checking that ‖ti − B·a‖L,pi < H for all the received subshares
ti). For the cheater identiﬁcation problem, one could use the Hamming norm error cor-
rection algorithms of [8,5] for the original CRT scheme. However, identifying cheaters
efﬁciently in our changeable threshold scheme requires an error correction algorithm
for the CRT code with up to k incorrect shares, and where all the correct CRT shares
are corrupted by small additive noise (after multiplication by a known constant). An
interesting problem could be to construct such an efﬁcient error correction algorithm
(better than trying to combine every subset of t shares and checking for consistency
of at least t ′ − k shares), perhaps by combining in some way our Lee norm error
correction method with the Hamming norm error correction methods of [8,5].
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Scott Contini and Igor Shparlinski for helpful
discussions. This work was supported by ARC Grants DP0451484 and DP0345366.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.1. We deﬁne a mapping f : Ŝs,p̂0 → V̂s,p̂0 and show that f is 1–1
and onto.
The mapping f is deﬁned as follows. To each integer a = ka ·p̂0 + ŝ ∈ Ŝs,p̂0 (note
that ka ∈ ZA/p̂0 for all such a), we associate the lattice vector f (a) = vka,ka , where
vka,ka
def=
(
Bp̂0ka + ka,1pi[1], . . . , Bp̂0ka + ka,ts pi[ts ],
ka
A/p̂0
2H
)
∈ LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0) (40)
and ka = (ka,1, . . . , ka,ts ) is the unique vector in Zts such that
‖vka,ka − ŝI‖∞ < H. (41)
To show that f is a well-deﬁned mapping from Ŝs,p̂0 to V̂s,p̂0 , we need to show
that for each a = ka ·p̂0 + ŝ ∈ Ŝs,p̂0 there exists a unique ka ∈ Zts satisfying (41).
Indeed, a = kap̂0 + ŝ ∈ Ŝs,p̂0 implies by deﬁnition that ‖B(kap̂0 + ŝ)− si[j ]‖L,pi[j ] < H
and hence that there exists ka,j ∈ Z such that |B(kap̂0 + ŝ) − si[j ] + ka,jpi[j ]| =
|Bkap̂0 + ka,jpi[j ] − ŝI [j ]| < H for all j ∈ [ts], and since ka ∈ ZA/p̂0 we also
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have |vka,ka [ts + 1] − ŝI [ts + 1]| = |( kaA/p̂0 )2H − (
A/p̂0−1
A/p̂0
)| < H , so there exists ka ∈
Zts satisfying (41). To show that ka satisfying (41) is unique, note that for any k =
(k1, . . . , kts ) ∈ Zts which is not equal to ka , there exists a coordinate j ∈ [ts] for which
kj = ka,j + u for some non-zero integer u, and this implies that |vka,k[j ] − ŝI [j ]| =
|Ba+(ka,j +u)pi[j ]−si[j ]| |u|pi[j ]−Hpi[j ]−HH (using |Ba+ka,jpi[j ]−si[j ]| <
H , |u|1 and pi[j ]2H ), so that (41) is not satisﬁed by k, and ka is unique as
claimed.
To show that f is 1–1, we simply observe that for any distinct pair a(1) = k(1)a p̂0 + ŝ
and a(2) = k(2)a p̂0 + ŝ in Ŝs,p̂0 we have k(1)a = k(2)a so the lattice vectors f (a(1)) and
f (a(2)) differ in the (ts + 1)th coordinate. Hence f is 1–1.
To show that f is onto, observe that any vector v in Vs,p has the form v = vka,ka
deﬁned in (40) for some ka ∈ Z and ka = (ka,1, . . . , ka,ts ) ∈ Zts , and satisﬁes (41).
Let a = kap̂0 + ŝ. Then by construction we know that f (a) = vka,ka , and it remains
to show that a ∈ Ŝs,p̂0 . Indeed, (41) implies that |Bp̂0ka + ka,jpi[j ] − (si[j ] − Bŝ)| =
|B(p̂0ka + ŝ)−si[j ]| < H so ‖Ba−si[j ]‖L,pi[j ] < H for all j ∈ [ts]. Also, |( kaA/p̂0 )2H −
(
A/p̂0−1
A/p̂0
)H | < H so |2ka − (A/p̂0 − 1)| < A/p̂0 which implies that ka ∈ ZA/p̂0 . Thus
a = p̂0ka + ŝ ∈ ZA (using ŝ ∈ Zp̂0 ) and hence a ∈ Ŝs,p̂0 , as required, and f is onto.
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We lower bound the number of lattice points in the box K1 =
{v ∈ Rts+1 : ‖v − sI‖∞ < H } of side length 2H which is centered on the non-lattice
vector sI , by the number of lattice points in the box K2 = {v ∈ Rts+1 : ‖v − s′I‖∞ <
H − } of side length 2(H − ), which is centered on a lattice vector s′I . We obtain
the lattice vector s′I by ‘rounding’ the non-lattice vector sI to a ‘nearby’ lattice vector.
Suppose that the ‘rounding error’ ‖sI − s′I‖∞ = . Then it is easy to see by the triangle
inequality that the box K2 deﬁned above is fully contained within the box K1, and
thus the number of lattice points inside K2 is indeed a lower bound on the number
of lattice points in K1. In turn, since any lattice is invariant under additions of any
lattice vector, it follows that the number of lattice points in the box K2 is equal to the
number of points in the origin-centered box {v ∈ Rts+1 : ‖v‖∞ < H − }, which is the
desired result.
It remains to prove the claimed bound on the rounding error  = ‖sI − s′I‖∞. By
deﬁnition of the (ts + 1)th Minkowski minimum ts+1 of the lattice, we know that
there exists a set (b1, . . . ,bts+1) of ts + 1 linearly independent lattice vectors such that
‖bj‖∞ < ts+1 for all j = 1, . . . , ts +1. Note that although the vectors (b1, . . . ,bts+1)
do not necessarily form a basis for the lattice, they do necessarily form a basis for
the vector space Rts+1 over R. Hence any vector sI ∈ Rts+1 can be expanded as
sI = c1b1 +· · ·+ cts+1bts+1 for some real coefﬁcients c1, . . . , cts+1. Now let s′I denote
the lattice vector which is obtained by rounding the coefﬁcients c1, . . . , cts+1 to the
nearest integers, i.e. we let
s′I = ĉ1b1 + · · · + ĉts+1bts+1,
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where for i = 1, . . . , ts + 1, ĉi denotes integer closest to ci . Then the rounding error is
 = ‖sI − s′I‖∞ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j
(cj − ĉj )bj
∥∥∥∥∥∥∞ 
1
2
∑
j
‖bj‖∞
(
ts + 1
2
)
ts+1,
as claimed. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Let  denote a positive real number (to be chosen later) which
satisﬁes minmax for some ﬁxed positive integers (to be chosen later) min1
and max min(Bp̂0, 2k). Note that  may depend on the choice of pI but we assume
the ﬁxed bounds min and max do not depend on pI . Now, observe that any v ∈
LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0) is of the form
vb,k
def=
(
Bp̂0b + k1pi[1], . . . , Bp̂0b + kts pi[ts ],
b
A/p̂0
2H
)
∈ Qts+1
for some b ∈ Z and k = (k1, . . . , kts ) ∈ Zts .
We now upper bound the fraction  of pI ∈ D(P tsk ) such that 1(LCRT(pI , A, B,H,
p̂0)) < , i.e. such that there exists a non-zero vector vb,k ∈ LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0)
with ‖vb,k‖∞ < .
For the case b = 0, we have, assuming v0,k = 0 that k = 0 and hence ‖v0,k‖∞
minj∈[ts ] pi[j ]2kmax.
For the case b = 0, suppose that ‖vb,k‖∞ <  for some k ∈ Zts . Then, considering
the last coordinate of vb,k, we know that the integer |b| satisﬁes
0 < |b| < A/p̂0
2H

⌈
A/p̂0
2H
max
⌉
.
Also, considering the ﬁrst ts coordinates of vb,k, the integer |b| also satisﬁes
‖(Bp̂0)|b|‖L,pI < max.
So, applying Lemma 2.1 (with parameters  = k, n = ts , Â =
⌈
A/p̂0
2H max
⌉
, Ĥ = max
and B̂ = Bp̂0max) we conclude that 1(LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0)) for all except
at most a fraction  of pI ∈ D(P tsk ), where

Â
(
2Ĥ log(B̂Â + Ĥ )k−1)ts
#D(P tsk )
.
Now, using B̂Ĥ and B̂1 we have B̂Â + Ĥ2B̂Â. Also we know [20] that
#Pk2k−1k−1 for all k5 and hence #P tsk /#D(P tsk )2ts using #Pk − (ts − 1)
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#Pk/2 which is implied by the hypothesis k − log k log ts + 2 (these inequalities are
obtained as in the proof of Theorem 4.1). Plugging these bounds in the above inequality
for  we get

2ts Â
(
2Ĥ log(2ÂB̂)
)ts
2(k−1)ts
.
Using Â =
⌈
A/p̂0
2H max
⌉
 A/p̂0
H
max (since A/p̂02H and maxmin1), and re-
calling that Ĥ = max, B̂ = Bp̂0, we obtain
2(4+log log(2 BH Amax))ts+1 
ts+1
max(
PI,max2H
A/p̂0
) , (42)
where PI,max = 2(k+1)ts is an upper bound on PI . Now, observing that det(LCRT(pI , A,
B,H, p̂0)) =
(
PI 2H
A/p̂0
)
, let us choose
 = 2− det(LCRT(pI , A, B,H, p̂0))
1
ts+1 ,
which is lower bounded for all pI ∈ P tsk by the ﬁxed integer
min =
⌊
2−
(
PI,min2H
A/p̂0
) 1
ts+1
⌋
,
(where PI,min = 2k·ts is a lower bound on PI ), and upper bounded for all pI ∈ P tsk by
the ﬁxed integer
max =
⌈
2−
(
PI,max2H
A/p̂0
) 1
ts+1
⌉
.
With the above choices, the assumed conditions min1 and max min(B, 2k) can
be readily seen to be implied by the lemma hypothesis
12−
(
2k·ts2H
A/p̂0
) 1
ts+1
 1
4
min(B, 2k),
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and plugging the values of min and max in (42) gives us the claimed bound
2−[−(log log(2k+2 BH A)+5)](ts+1)
for the ‘bad’ fraction of pI ∈ D(P tsk ). This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4.4. Let N denote the number of points of the lattice L in the box
K1 = {v ∈ Rn : ‖v − s‖∞ < H }. Suppose that on each lattice point v in the box,
we center an open box Sv = {z ∈ Rn : ‖z − v‖∞ < 1(L)/2} of side length 1(L)/2.
Note that as v runs through all lattice vectors in the box K1, the boxes Sv are disjoint
(because by the triangle inequality, the existence of a vector z in two of the boxes Sv1
and Sv2 implies that ‖v1 − v2‖∞ < 1(L), which is a contradiction since v1 − v2 is
itself a lattice vector), and occupy a total volume N ·1(L)n.
On the other hand, applying the triangle inequality again, we have that all the above
N disjoint boxes Sv are contained within the box K2 = {z ∈ Rn : ‖v − s‖∞ <
H + 1(L)/2}, which has volume Vol(K2) = (2H + 1(L))n.
It follows that
Vol(K2) = (2H + 1(L))nN ·1(L)n,
and therefore,
N
(
2H
1(L) + 1
)n
,
as required. This completes the proof. 
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